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Abstract
The Southeast Asian region has experienced transboundary haze on an almost annual basis
for decades. ASEAN has been the platform for regional cooperation and collaboration for
regional haze mitigation since 1985. ASEAN’s main legally-binding instrument for this purpose
is the 2012 Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (ATHP). Despite this, haze episodes
continue to persist until present times. This paper analyses recent legal developments related to
transboundary haze management among the three main affected countries; Indonesia, Malaysia
and Singapore. Particularly, it examines Singapore’s Transboundary Haze Pollution Act, an
extra-territorial act that extends criminal and civil liability to anyone causing or contributing
to haze in Singapore. It also analyses Indonesia’s ratification of the ATHP, which followed soon
after Singapore unilaterally passed their Act. Finally, it considers Malaysia’s indecisiveness in
deciding its next legal move in the face of these developments among its neighbours. The ASEAN
Way, a set of behavioural or procedural norms that govern regional engagement, prescribes nonlegalistic procedures and non-interference of sovereign rights, among others. This paper uses the
framework of the “myth” of the ASEAN Way, popularly argued by Nischalke in 2000, to explain
the changing positions of the associated states towards legal recourse related to transboundary
haze. It argues that ASEAN member states can choose whether or not to adhere to the ASEAN
Way in order to preserve crucial economic interests, without suffering any consequences. Hence,
shifting national interests among these three states over time can likewise explain shifting
attitudes and compliance towards certain ASEAN Way norms.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Haze is defined as “sufficient smoke, dust, moisture, and vapor
suspended in air to impair visibility”, and it is classified as trans
boundary when “its density and extent is so great at the source that it
remains at measurable levels after crossing into a country’s airspace”1.
The Southeast Asian region has experienced trans boundary haze on
This research was partially supported by the Singapore Social Science Research
Council (SSRC) grant on Sustainable Governance of Transboundary Environmental
Commons in Southeast Asia, grant code MOE2016-SSRTG-068.
1
ASEAN Secretariat 2008. Information on Fire and Haze [Online]. Jakarta: ASEAN
Secretariat. Available: http://haze.asean.org/about-us/information-on-fire-and-haze/
[Accessed 1 August 2009].
*

Copyright © 2018 – Helena Varkkey, Published by Lembaga Pengkajian Hukum Internasional

Helena Varkkey

an almost annual basis for decades. This smoke haze originates from
peat and forest fires, primarily from Indonesia and to a lesser extent
Malaysia. A majority of these fires have been traced back to deliberate
(as a quick, cheap and easy way to clear land for planting) or accidental
(as a result of the drying out of land during clearing) behavior linked to
commercial plantations, especially palm oil and pulp and paper2. At its
worst, the haze can travel to reach six Southeast Asian nations; Indonesia,
Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, and the Philippines, disrupting
visibility, health and general wellbeing across the region3. Due to their
proximity to the source of most of the fires, Indonesia, Singapore and
Malaysia are hit hardest and most regularly by trans boundary haze,
regularly experience school closures, airport shutdowns, and economic
slowdowns during haze periods.
ASEAN has been the platform for regional cooperation and
collaboration for regional haze mitigation since 1985. That year, after
agreeing to acknowledging haze as a regional concern, ASEAN member
states adopted the Agreement on Conservation of Nature and Natural
Resources. This agreement specifically referred to air pollution and its
“trans frontier environmental effects”. The first ASEAN-level activity
that specifically addressed haze was in 1992, with the Workshop on Trans
boundary Pollution and Haze in ASEAN Countries4. This was followed
by several other soft-law initiatives like the Co-operation Plan and Haze
Technical Task Force (1995), the Regional Haze Action Plan (1997), the
Hanoi Plan of Action (1998), and the ASEAN Peatland Management
Initiative (2002). This was eventually followed by ASEAN’s first ever
legally-binding mechanism, the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary
Haze Pollution (ATHP) in 20025. Despite this, haze episodes continue
to persist until present times. Common arguments among scholars for
the lack of success of these ASEAN initiatives are the limitations of the
ASEAN Way norms which govern modes of engagement in the region,
Helena Varkkey, The Haze Problem in Southeast Asia: Palm Oil and Patronage,
London, Routledge.2016.
3
Judith Mayer. Transboundary Perspectives on Managing Indonesia’s Fires. The
Journal of Environment & Development, 15, 202-233.2006.
4
ASEAN Secretariat 1995. ASEAN Meeting on the Management of Transboundary
Pollution. Kuala Lumpur.
5
ASEAN Secretariat 2002. ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution
Kuala Lumpur.
2
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and Indonesia’s decade-long non-ratification of the ATHP.
This paper analyses recent legal developments related to transboundary
haze management in Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia, in the context
of regional governance. Particularly, it examines Singapore’s 2014
transboundary Haze Pollution Act (THPA), an extraterritorial act that
extends criminal and civil liability to anyone, causing or contributing to
haze in Singapore. It then analyses Indonesia’s long-awaited ratification
of the ATHP, which followed soon after Singapore passed their unilateral
Act. Finally, it considers Malaysia’s indecisiveness in deciding its next
legal move in the face of these developments among its neighbours.
This paper uses the framework of the “myth” of the ASEAN Way,
popularly argued by Nischalke6, to explain the changing positions of
the associated states towards legal recourse related to transboundary
haze. It argues that ASEAN state can choose to not adhere to the
ASEAN Way in order to preserve crucial interests, without suffering
any consequences at the regional level. The paper concludes that shifts
in national interests can explain why certain countries changed their
engagement patterns with the ASEAN organization and also with other
ASEAN member countries over the haze issue.
II. ASEAN WAY NORMS AND STATE COMPLIANCE
The ASEAN Way is a set of behavioural and procedural norms that
include the pursuit of consensus; the sanctity of sovereign rights and
the related concept of non-interference; the principles of sensitivity
and politeness; non-confrontational negotiation processes; behindthe-scenes discussions; an emphasis on informal and non-legalistic
procedures; and flexibility7. Opinions are divided as to the strength of
the ASEAN Way norms. Severino8 has described the ASEAN Way as a
“doctrine”; something ideological and therefore, to be adhered to at all
costs. As such, the ASEAN organization is tightly bound to these norms
Tobias Ingo Nischalke. Insights from ASEAN’s foreign policy co-operation: The
“ASEAN way”, a real spirit or phantom? Contemporary Southeast Asia, 22, 89.2000.
7
Timo Kivimaki. The long peace of ASEAN. Journal of Peace Studies, 38.2001.
8
Rodolfo C Severino. Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community: Insights
from the former ASEAN Secretary-General, Singapore, ISEAS.2006.
6
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as guidance devices for decision-making9.
Scholars who subscribe to this understanding of the ASEAN Way
norms have argued that the persistence of the haze in the Southeast
Asian region is caused by the limitations posed by the ASEAN Way of
regional governance. They argued that while regional environmental
governance can be instrumental in finding solutions to collective action
problems, this model of ASEAN cooperation does not work when
dealing with environmental challenges such as fires and haze10. Due to
the necessarily strict adherence to the ASEAN Way, the haze problem
is approached through the non-interference principle. This impedes
collective problem-solving methods, as other states are not allowed to
pressure members into acting in accordance with collective interest.
Because of this, it is argued that ASEAN states struggle to draw a
line between respecting their neighbouring government’s right to selfdetermination and cooperatively mediating the region’s haze problem11.
Therefore, ASEAN has emphasized policy pronouncements and rhetoric
over actual implementation of effective haze mitigation efforts12, largely
rendering most of the mechanisms described above ineffective. Hence,
while ASEAN states “undoubtedly desire the elimination of the haze
problem”, they were unable to balance this with their stronger desire to
comply with the broader ASEAN Way norms, especially those of nonShaun Narine. Institutional theory and Southeast Asia: The case of ASEAN. World
Affairs, 161, 33, Kratochwil, F. V. 1989. Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs, Cambridge, Cambrdige University Press, Kratochwil, F. V. 1984. The Force of
Prescriptions. International Organization, 38. 1998.
10
Bryan Tan. The Norms that Weren’t: ASEAN’s Shortcomings in Dealing with
Transboundary Air Pollution International Environmental Politics, Spring 2005, Japan Center for International Exchange. 2000
. Fires and Haze in Southeast Asia. In: Noda, P. J. (ed.) Cross-Sectoral Partnerships
in Enhancing Human Security. Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, Yahaya, Nadzri. 2000. Transboundary Air Pollution: Haze Pollution in Southeast Asia
and its Significance. Journal of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations, 2, 41-50, NGUITRAGOOL, P. 2011. Negotiating the Haze Treaty. Asian Survey, 51, 356-378, Chang,
L. L. & Rajan, R. S. 2001. Regional Versus Multilateral Solutions to Transboundary
Environmental Problems: Insights from the Southeast Asian Haze. Transboundary
Environmental Problems in Asia, 655-670. 2005.
11
Tan, see note 11, p. 3
12
Chang & Rajan, see note 11, p. 3
9
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interference and decision making based on consensus13.
Other scholars find these arguments to be flawed. ASEAN member
states do not blindly follow the ASEAN Way principles due to some
deeply ingrained “habit”. Instead, states pick and choose whether or
not to adhere to the ASEAN Way principles, depending on whether it is
in their interests to do so. Indeed, this is the crux of the ASEAN model
of regionalism. While, for example, the European Union model of
regionalism is characterized by the pooling of sovereignty, the ASEAN
model is characterized by the maintenance of national sovereignty14
and by extension, national interest. This is the so-called “myth” of the
ASEAN Way, so described by Nischalke15 in his 2000 paper on foreign
policy cooperation among ASEAN member states. Indeed, there have
been many instances where the ASEAN Way was deliberately ignored
so that ASEAN states could pursue narrow understandings of their
self-interests16. Furthermore, no ASEAN member state had any serious
reservations about the policy outcomes in most of these cases, despite
them being contrary to the ASEAN Way. Hence, an ASEAN state can
choose to not adhere to the ASEAN Way in order to preserve crucial
interests, without suffering any consequences at the regional level17.
I have previously used the “myth” of the ASEAN Way framework
to explain the ineffectiveness of ASEAN haze mitigation efforts up till
early 201418. I argued that the patron-client networks (both local and
cross-border) within the region’s palm oil plantation sector have had
a strong influence over Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore’s national
interests. This is due to the mutually beneficial relationship between
government officials (patrons) and well-connected businessmen
Vinod K. Aggarwal & Jonathan T.Chow. The perils of consensus: How ASEAN’s
meta-regime undermines economic and environmental cooperation. Review of International Political Economy, 17, 262-290. 2010.
14
Philomena Murray. The European Union as an integration entreprenur in East Asia
- Yardstick or cautionary tale? Australian Political Studies Association Conference,
27-29 September 2010 Melbourne, KIM, M. 2011. Theorizing ASEAN Integration.
Asian Perspectives, 35, 407-435.2010.
15
Nischalke, see note 7, p. 3
16
Shaun Narine. ASEAN and the management of regional security. Pacific Affairs,
71, 195.1998.
17
Nischalke, see note 7, p. 3
18
Varkkey, see note 3, p. 2
13
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(clients). Hence, elite-centric issues like continued access to, and ability
to exploit natural resources took priority over citizens’ health and safety.
Because of this, the states involved chose to adhere to the ASEAN Way
when dealing with the haze. By insisting on ASEAN Way principles
like national sovereignty and self-determination19, member states have
been able shape collective mitigation initiatives at the ASEAN level in
accordance with their most pertinent interests at the time – that of the
elites. Such behavior has been predicted by Nesadurai20, who has argued
that “the ASEAN Way is often only strictly adhered to and enforced by
states in areas where crucial economic interests are affected”.
This has weakened ASEAN’s capacity to create and enforce haze
mitigation efforts that serve collective regional interests. It has resulted
in a sort of paralysis where haze initiatives instead protect elite corporate
interests, preserve state sovereignty, and deflect responsibility on the
haze issue. Even when the ASEAN member states agreed to adopt the
legally-binding ATHP, this was done while still closely adhering to the
ASEAN Way. This ensured that the ATHP became a highly watereddown document that lacked hard law mechanisms and continued to
protect current national economic interests21. Furthermore, as mentioned
briefly above, Indonesia, the country of origin of most of the smoke
haze, conveniently remained the only ASEAN member state yet to ratify
the ATHP after more than a decade of the agreement coming into force.
Indonesia’s prolonged snub of the ASEAN Way principle of consensus
(after all the other nine member states ratified the agreement) did not
incur any serious consequences for Indonesia, further reinforcing the
“myth” argument that states who do not comply to the ASEAN Way
will not suffer any ill-effects of non-compliance.
It can be concluded that in the beginning of 2014, the three
member states most involved in the transboundary haze issue shared
relatively similar national interests. All three countries were heavily
invested in the region’s palm oil sector. The sector was regarded as
Indonesia’s “miracle crop”, contributing a steady 5-7% of GDP yearly.
Many Malaysian and Singaporean plantation companies, both facing
Narine, see note 17, p. 4
Helen E. S. Nesadurai. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). New
Political Economy, 13, 225. 2008.
21
Varrkey, see note 3, p. 2
19
20
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limited land banks for cultivation at home, were encouraged by their
governments to venture out to the vast lands of Indonesia to cultivate
palm oil as well. At its peak, up to half of all palm oil plantations in
Indonesia were linked to either Malaysian or Singaporean interests22.
The patron-client culture of doing business, which was common in all
three countries, ensured that business elites in this sector enjoyed the
protection and support of not only the Indonesian government but also
home governments. Hence, I have argued that the flurry of activity at the
ASEAN level was a strategic move by ASEAN member states to show
the increasingly vocal civil society in all three countries that they were
“doing something” about the haze, while at the same time preserving
their crucial economic interests23.
However, subsequent events towards the second half of 2014 saw
a significant change of heart among two of the central countries in
the haze equation, Singapore and Indonesia. Firstly, after decades of
willing cooperation and support of ASEAN haze mitigation efforts,
Singapore unilaterally established its own national legal instrument
to address haze, the transboundary Haze Pollution Act24. Secondly,
after almost a decade of dragging its feet, Indonesia finally decided
to ratify the ATHP25. What triggered these two counter-intuitive legal
developments? Using the “myth” framework, this paper continues
below to argue in detail how the change in behavior of both states can
be explained by evolving national interests.
III.

SINGAPORE: EXTRA-TERRITORIAL UNILATERALISM
The parliament of Singapore passed the Transboundary Haze
Pollution Act on 5 August 2014. This Act provides for criminal and civil
liability for any entity that engages in conduct, authorizes or condones
Aditia Maruli Radja. “Half of RI`s oil palm plantations foreign-owned”. Antara
Magazine. Jakarta: Financial Times Information Limited, The Star. “Helping to clear
the haze Eight Malaysian-owned firms under Indonesian probe”. The Star, 25 June
2013.
23
Varkkey, see note 3, p. 2
24
Parliment of Singapore 2014. Transboundary Haze Pollution Bill No. 18/2014.
25
Wahyudi Soeriaatmadja.“Indonesia’s parliament agrees to ratify Asean haze pact”.
Straits Times, 16 September 2014.
22
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any conduct regardless of whether the entity is in or outside Singapore,
which results in transboundary haze pollution in Singapore26. It is one
of the few extra-territorial environmental legislations in the world,
as even foreign companies without any assets in Singapore would be
liable under the Act27. The act gives considerable investigative powers
to the National Environmental Agency (NEA) of Singapore. Now, the
Agency is empowered to request for information directly from these
companies, bypassing formal diplomatic processes. It can also take
preventive measures, including issuing a notice to require the entity to
control fires or deploy personnel28.
Several international law principles are used by Singapore to claim
jurisdiction under this Act, detailed as follows. The “passive personality”
principle arises when the victim of the harm caused in a citizen. The
“protective” principle is when the interests of the legislating state are
being threatened, typically national security. The “effects doctrine” is
for conduct wholly outside the country that has consequences within
its borders29. It also calls into effect the principle of sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas, or “use your own property as not to injure that of
another” (Republic of Singapore, 2016). Of course, all this is rooted
in several international treaties. The United Nations Principles on
Business and Human Rights provides that “states should set our clearly
the expectation that all business enterprises domiciled in their territory
and /or jurisdiction respect human rights throughout their operations”
and corporations have a related “responsibility to respect human rights
[that] requires [they] (a) avoid causing or contributing to adverse human
rights impacts through their own activities, and address such impacts
when the occur; (b) seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights
impacts that are directly linked to their operations, products or services
by their business relationships, even if they have not contributed to those
impacts”30. And of course, Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration,
UNEP 2015. Air Quality Policies. UNEP.
Alan Khee-Jin Tan.The ‘haze’ crisis in Southeast Asia: Assessing Singapore’s
Transboundary Haze Pollution Act. Faculty of Law Working Paper Series. Singapore:
National University of Singapore. 2015.
28
Rajah & Tann 2014 The Transboundary Haze Pollution Act 2014: Impact and Consequences. Singapore.
29
Tan, see note 28, p. 6
30
Mahdev Mohan.A domestic solution for cross border human rights harm: Singa26
27
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which both countries have acceded to, stresses that while countries
have “the right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own
environmental policies”, they also have the “responsibility to ensure the
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other states or areas beyond the limits of their national
jurisdiction” (the “precautionary principle”)31.
This Act by Singapore has been described as an attempt to
“criminalize” and “securitize” haze. While internal Indonesian
regulations do exist which criminalize clearing land by fire (Regulation
Number 4 of 2001 on Pollution Control and/or Damage Relating to
the Environment, Forest Fires, or Land in 2001)32, they are not being
implemented effectively in practise, made worse by the rampant
corruption and protectionism enjoyed by well-connected clients. As a
result, if the cases are brought to court at all, prosecutors in Indonesia
generally press for lower charges or offences which result in courts
handing down relatively light sentences33. Hence, in the face of a source
government that refuses to effectively criminalize haze, Singapore is
attempting “extra-territorial criminalization”. In contrast to past haze
mitigation efforts at the ASEAN level, this Act focuses on companies,
instead of the state34. It is a market-based tool that seeks to raise the
relative cost of land clearing by fire in Indonesia. It aims to tilt the
incentives in the country in favour of less polluting means of clearing
land35. It largely relies on the concern of the companies’ reputational
risks to their core business and image, which would arise if they are
charged under the Act36.

pore’s haze pollution law. Business and Human Rights Journal, 1-9.2017.
31
Janice Ser Huay Lee,ZeehanJaafar, Alan Khee JinTan, Luis R.Carrasco, J. JacksonEwing, David P.Bickford, Edward L.Webb & Lian PinKoh . Toward clearer skies:
Challenges in regulating transboundary haze in Southeast Asia. Environmental Science & Policy, 55, 87-95.2016.
32
Marco Bassano & Denis Tan. Dissecting the Transboundary Haze Pollution Bill of
Singapore. Columbia School of International and Public Affairs.2014.
33
Tan, see note 28, p. 6.
34
Rajah & Tann, see note 29, p. 6
35
Tan & Bassano, see note 33, p. 6
36
Raman Letchumanan. Singapore’s Transboundary Haze Pollution Act: Silver Bullet or Silver Lining? RSIS Commentary. Singapore.2015.
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An Indonesian scholar has described this as an act of securitization37;
an extreme version of politicization that enables extraordinary means to
be used in the name of security38. Sometime prior to the second-half of
2014, Singapore’s perception of the haze problem shifted from one that
was a regular transboundary issue (not threatening national security)
to an extraordinary transboundary issue (threatening national security).
In line with the “protective” principle described above, this served to
justify the extraordinary action of passing a unilateral extra-territorial
act in an attempt to protect national security in Singapore. This paper
argues that this shift of perception of the haze issue is rooted in the
nature of national interests. Nye39 has argued that national interests
are a subjective “set of shared priorities regarding relations with the
rest of the world”. National interests are not consistent, especially in
today’s information age, where massive flows of information create
difficulties to “maintain a consistent set of shared priorities in foreign
policy”. Gutjahr40 has illustrated the changeability of national interests
in his case study of Germany in 1995. In the same vein, here I illustrate
how Singapore’s national interest is also subjective and have changed
over time.
As with Malaysia and Indonesia, Singapore remains a major player
in the regional palm oil sector. Even though there is a dearth of oil palm
plantations in Singapore itself, Singaporean presence in the Indonesian
palm oil sector has always been notable41, both on the plantation side
as well as for processing and refining. Hence, palm oil has for many
years been crucial to Singapore’s economic interests. Likewise, many
of these investments enjoyed close relations with Singapore’s ruling
elite, resulting in the amalgamation of national interests with that of
the government and business elites. Hence, it was unsurprising that
Kardina Gultom. Sekuritisasi Kabut Asap di Singapura 1997-2014. Indonesian
Perspective, 1, 49-66. 2016.
38
Barry Buzan, Ole Waever & Jaap de Wilde. Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Colorado, Lynne-Rienner.1998.
39
Joseph S. Nye Jr. Redefining the National Interest. Foreign Affairs, 78, 22-35.1999.
40
Lothar Gutjahr. Stability, Integration and Global Responsibility: Germany’s Changing Perspectives on National Interests. Review of International Studies, 21, 301317.1995.
41
WALHI & SAWIT WATCH. Memorandum: Issues Surrounding Malaysia Palm Oil
Investments and Plantation Operations in Indonesian Palm Oil Industry. 2009.
37
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Singapore, for many years, was largely in step with Indonesian and
Malaysian attitudes towards haze; that it was unsavory but necessary
side effect along the path of development42. However, the passing of
the THPA is a clear indicator that Singapore’s national interests are no
longer squarely in line with elite interests. While Singaporean presence
in this sector remains high till today, (Nazir Foead, an Indonesian
official spearheading the Peatland Restoration Agency was quoted
recently saying that “you will be surprised to see how many Singaporean
investments are involved in driving the peat swamp conversion
[for oil palm plantations] – money from Singapore”43, the THPA in
practise does not serve to protect Singaporean companies operating
in Indonesia. In fact, Singaporean companies are most at risk under
this act. Even though technically, even foreign companies without any
assets in Singapore are liable under the Act, realistically, this Act can
most easily be brought to bear upon companies based in Singapore, or
at least have business or officers linked in Singapore. This is because,
despite the extra-territorial nature of the Act, Singapore cannot compel
officers who are in Indonesia to attend court proceedings in Singapore
even after issuing a valid warrant44.
Hence, why is Singapore putting their own allies, previously so
important to its national interests at risk with this Act? This paper
argues that over time, the actors most important to Singapore’s national
interests have changed. As the most modern and industrialized country
in Southeast Asia today, Singapore’s human resources has become more
lucrative that its natural resources. Human resource-reliant industries
like Business Services (15.8%) and Finance and Insurance (13.1%) are
among the top three contributing sectors to the Singaporean industry45.
Hence, transboundary haze affects Singapore’s most important resource:
its work force. Ever-worsening haze episodes effectively closed the
entire tiny island, resulting in lost man hours and the deteriorating
VARKKEY a, see note 3, p. 2
Audrey Tan.” Clear skies likely despite haze season: Indonesian official”. The
Straits Times, 19 May2017.
44
Rajah & Tann, see note 29, p. 6
45
Statistic Singapore. Share of GDP by Industry [Online]. Singapore: Statistics Singapore. Available: http://www.singstat.gov.sg/statistics/visualising-data/charts/shareof-gdp-by-industry [Accessed 23 August.2017.
42
43
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health of its valuable work force46. One source has put economic losses
suffered by Singapore during the recent 2013 haze episode as high
as SGD342 million (USD250 million)47. The haze has also reduced
Singapore’s attractiveness as an expat and investment destination48.
Recall my argument above that ASEAN member states were
comfortable with ASEAN-level haze cooperation because it was a
platform where they could show civil society that they were “doing
something” about the haze, while at the same time preserving their
crucial economic interests49. However, recent years saw an increase
in the flow of information, both from Indonesia to Singapore (about
the on-the-ground situation), and from the Singaporean civil society to
the Singaporean government. As noted above, such information flows
encourage governments to reconsider their national interest priorities.
Hence, as civil society in Singapore became increasingly more vocal
and active50 over haze, the Singaporean government began to take the
concerns of this increasingly economically important group to heart.
Furthermore, not wanting to look ineffective in the face of public outcry
is especially important to the ruling party now, especially after significant
decline in popular support for the party after the 2011 parliamentary
elections51. As such, the Singaporean government began to understand
and frame the haze as a situation where its national security interests
were being threatened. Singapore hence developed the political will to
act more strongly (even unilaterally) in attempts to preserve its new
national interest and national security priorities, ultimately culminating
in the THPA.
As mentioned above, the “myth” of the ASEAN Way proposes
that an ASEAN state can choose whether or not to adhere to the
ASEAN Way in order to preserve crucial interests. On the surface,
Jeremy Grant & Ben Bland. “Singapore widens battle against toxic haze from forest
fires”. Financial Times, 19 Februar 2014.
47
Gultom, see note 38, p. 7
48
Joanne Poh. “3 Reasons Why Singapore May NOT Be the Most Liveable City For
Asian Expats”. MoneySmart. Yahoo Finance: Yahoo.16 March 2016.
49
Varkkey, see note 3, p. 2
50
Arlina Arshad. “Singapore team digs in to help Riau village combat haze”. Straits
Times Asia, 23 May 2017.
51
Tan & Bassano, see note 33, p. 6
46
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Singapore’s decision to bring in the force the THPA can be seen as a
marked departure from the traditional ASEAN approach to resolving
regional issues, which prioritizes diplomatic over legal solutions52. By
putting into place an extra-territorial legislation that attempts to extend
Singapore’s jurisdiction into Indonesia’s territory, it can be regarded as
a direct violation of the ASEAN Way principle of non-interference in
the internal affairs of other states. Hence, in accordance with the “myth”
framework, it can be deduced that Singapore chose not to adhere to the
ASEAN Way in order to preserve Singapore’s “new” national interest
priorities, as discussed above. The “myth” framework further argues
that states choose whether or not to comply with the ASEAN Way
norms without suffering any negative consequences at the regional
level. Indeed, in the early days of the THPA, no ASEAN member state
raised any serious protest to Singapore’s legislative decision. Indeed,
Indonesia was generally supportive of Singapore’s Act. At the proposal
stage, the Act received public support from Indonesian officials and
academics. Once it came into force, many Indonesian lawmakers also
expressed support for the legislation. Most notably, Indonesia’s new
leader, Joko Widodo (popularly known as Jokowi), also declared his
support for the Act just days after winning the presidential election53.
Hence, during this “honeymoon” period, Singapore suffered no ill
consequences for not strictly adhering to central principles of the
ASEAN Way. However, this was not sustained for long. To further shed
light on these developments and what it means for ASEAN regionalism
and the salience of its norms, Indonesia’s subsequent responses to the
THPA is considered in the next section.
IV. INDONESIA:
RESPONSES,
RATIFICATION
AND
CONSEQUENCES
Almost concurrent to the developments in Singapore, another
notable legal development occurred on Indonesia’s side. After more
than a decade of dragging its feet on the matter, the Indonesian
parliament finally decided to ratify the ATHP in September 2014, about
a month after the passage of Singapore’s THPA. This was, predictably,
52
53

Mayer, see note 4, p. 2
Tan & Bassano, see note 33, p. 6
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welcomed with much fanfare by the other ASEAN member states54
(recall that Indonesia’s non-ratification has long been considered a vital
explanation of the ineffectiveness of ASEAN haze mitigation efforts). It
is interesting to consider Indonesia’s motivations in ratifying the ATHP
at this time. As mentioned above, Indonesia weathered out one decade
of non-ratification (which was clearly against the ASEAN Way norm of
consensus) with almost non-existent consequences from other ASEAN
member states. Arguably, Singapore’s 2014 THPA was the first real
“consequence” of Indonesia’s non-ratification. So, what triggered the
change of heart in Indonesia? Unlike Singapore, there is no visible shift
of national interest priorities – the palm oil sector still remains one of
the most lucrative economic sectors for Indonesia, and the relationship
between the government and business elites in the sector remains strong.
Two factors are notable in the context of this unexpected ratification:
the stepping down of Indonesia’s outgoing president, Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono (SBY) and indeed Singapore’s THPA. It is pertinent to note
that the ATHP was ratified not under the Jokowi administration, but by
SBY, as one of his few final acts in office55. Despite many years of using
the excuse that the ratifying the ATHP would not be in the national
interests of Indonesia56, it is indeed fitting that SBY, an avid “ASEANist” and supporter of Southeast Asia’s regional project, managed to
push through the ratification of the ATHP before his retirement, to
show his personal support for the “ASEAN project”. However, more
important for consideration is the effect of the THPA. The draft THPA
was announced and released for public consultation in February 201457,
hence Indonesia was well aware of Singapore’s intentions to pass the Act
early on in the year. As will become clear below, Indonesia could have
pushed for the ratification of the ATHP as “insurance” against Singapore
should Singapore threaten Indonesia’s crucial interests with the THPA.
Even though non-ratification previously served to protect Indonesian
elite interests from unwanted scrutiny and pressure, the prospect of
Straits Times. “Ratification of Asean haze agreement a historic step in tackling
problem: Malaysia PM Najib Razak”. Straits Times, 8 September 2015.
55
I Made Sentana & Joko Hariyanto. Indonesia Ratifies Regional Pollution Treaty as
Haze Spreads to Neighbors. The Wall Street Journal, 16 September.2014.
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these interests being legally liable under the THPA would clearly be the
bigger threat. Hence, Indonesia’s act of ratification should not be read
as a change of heart towards a more pro-ASEAN stance, but instead
as an updated strategy to preserve its crucial national interests, that of
the palm oil sector and the elites within the sector. While Indonesia’s
national interests remained the same, strategies to preserve them have
had to evolve to suit new developments in the neighbourhood.
Indeed, while Indonesia did not at first raise any serious protest
towards the THPA, and in fact informally threw its support behind it,
Indonesia’s stance soon changed when Singapore first attempted to
use the Act against Indonesian interests. In 2016, Singapore obtained
a court warrant against the director of an Indonesian company linked
to haze-causing fires. This led to an immediate protest by Indonesia’
Ambassador to Singapore in May 201658. This was followed by much
sterner statements from Indonesia’s Environment and Forestry Minister,
Siti Nurbaya Bakar in June 2016. Directly referring to the act, she
denied that Singapore could step into Indonesia’s legal domain on the
issue of forest fires because the two countries did not have an agreement
on the matter59. Most notably, the Minister also claimed that the act
was “controversial” and that Singapore did not show “mutual respect”
in accordance with the ASEAN Way. She reminded Singapore that the
ATHP has precedence over haze issues60. As it stands, the warrant still
stands and the director against whom the warrant has been issued still
can be detained by the NEA for investigations if the director enters
Singapore61.
These statements clearly show the fruits of Indonesia’s foresight in
ratifying the ATHP. Now, Indonesia could take the moral high ground
by claiming that Indonesia is giving full cooperation at the ASEAN
level for haze mitigation (by ratifying the ATHP), and in contrast,
Singapore was not (by “ignoring” the ATHP which has precedence).
Saifulbahri Ismail. “Protest conveyed to Singapore Environment Minister: Indonesia”. Channel NewsAsia, 16 May 2016.
59
Saifulbahri Ismail. “Singapore cannot enter Indonesia’s legal domain on forest fire
issues: Forestry Minister”. Channel NewsAsia, 14 June 2016.
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Furthermore, it is clear that to Indonesia’s reasoning, Singapore’s Act
clearly violates the ASEAN Way norms, and that Indonesia was not
comfortable with that. However, closer examination of the ATHP calls
into question whether or not Singapore’s Act is indeed overstepping
the bounds of the ATHP. It is important to note that the “precautionary
principle” is in fact adopted within Article 3.3 of the ATHP. This can
be taken to mean that the Act is in fact in line with and complement to
provisions of the ATHP62. The ATHP, for example, calls upon all states
“to take legislative, administrative and/or other measures to implement
their obligations to prevent and monitor transboundary haze pollution”
and obliges the state where “transboundary haze pollution originates to
respond promptly to a request for relevant information or consultation
sought by an affected state”. Hence, under the ATHP, Singapore’ is
technically allowed to take legislative action – and chose to do so in
the form of the THPA. Furthermore, Indonesia is obliged to respond
promptly to Singapore’s requests for information related to such action
(which Indonesia has not been doing - Singapore only resorted to the
court warrant only after repeatedly asking for information related to the
case from Indonesian authorities)63.
The complexity of the matter stems from the fact that the ATHP, as
a legally-binding document, itself challenges the norms of the ASEAN
Way which prescribes non-legalistic procedures. This has led to a backand-forth between the two governments about whether Singapore is in
violation of the ASEAN Way norms or not. In response to Indonesia’s
statements, Singapore issued a statement clarifying that the Act did
not mean to challenge Indonesia’s sovereignty and the fact that the
Singapore has repeatedly asked for information from Indonesian
authorities on such cases proves that Singapore very much respects
Indonesia’s sovereignty64. Specifically, Singapore argued that the THPA
is not intended to supplant the laws and enforcement actions of other
countries (and indeed ASEAN); rather, the intention is to complement
Mohan, see note 31, p. 6
Raman Letchumanan.Singapore’s Transboundary Haze Pollution Act: Silver Bullet
or Silver Lining? RSIS Commentary. Singapore.2015.
64
Channel Newsasia.“Transboundary Haze Pollution Act not about national sovereignty: MEWR”. Channel NewsAsia, 15 June 2016.
62
63

568

Revisiting The “Myth” Of The Asean Way:

the efforts of other countries to hold companies to account65. In this
way, Singapore presented the THPA as a “key component to a holistic
solution which will include further multilateral cooperation as well
as a recommitment to the ATHP” 66. Based on this, Singapore argued
that Indonesia should instead welcome this additional tool to address
the haze issue67. Indeed, it answers the age-old Indonesian argument
that victim states should look at their own companies first before
blaming Indonesia68. Seen here, while the act of passing the THPA
does not conform to several ASEAN Way norms (non-interference,
non-legalistic procedures, etc), Singapore was able to justify its actions
using the ATHP mechanism.
Indonesia’s cooperation is highly important in ensuring the
effectiveness of the THPA, especially when it comes to the attempted
prosecution of non-Singaporean linked entities. As only official data can
be admissible in the Singapore courts, Indonesia’s willingness to share
the information and maps relating to entities that start fires are vital
for successful prosecution of liable parties69. Furthermore, additional
evidence like on-the-ground witness testimonials and aerial photography
using low-flying planes would be important in determining where the
fires have been started, whether they have been lighted deliberately, and
by whom. This requires the explicit consent of Indonesia to enter and
fly over their territory70. Hence, Indonesia’s vocal opposition of the Act
thus far is almost certainly limiting the effectiveness of the THPA and
preventing cases to be feasibly brought to Singaporean courts under
this law. By doing so, Indonesia can again be seen to be strategically
using the ASEAN Way in order to preserve their crucial interests. As
soon as the interests of the elite business groups were threatened (i.e.
with the issuance of the warrant from Singapore), Indonesia chose to
use the ASEAN Way norms as the basis of protest against Singapore’s
THPA. By shaming Singapore for “ignoring” ASEAN procedures and
Republic of Singapore 2016. Protection of the Atmosphere- Information on Domestic Legislation of Singapore- Transboundary Haze Pollution Act 2014.
66
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refusing to cooperate based on the reasoning that Singapore did not act
in accordance with the ASEAN Way, Indonesia is placing more weight
on ASEAN Way norms than usual (evident in the fact that Indonesia did
not ratify the ATHP for a decade). Hence, the “myth” of the ASEAN
Way is seen in strategic practice here.
The “myth” framework argues that members should be able to pick
and choose compliance without suffering any negative consequences.
Note that Singapore’s passing of the THPA resulted in negative
consequences in the form of the diplomatic spat with Indonesia as
described above. However, this spat has remained confined squarely
within the scope of the haze issue. Both countries have not allowed
these grievances to affect broader Indonesia-Singapore relations.
Indeed, Singapore and Indonesia just recently lavishly celebrated its
50th anniversary of bilateral and diplomatic relations71. While relations
over the haze has been at best civil and at worse tense between the
two countries since the incident with the warrant in 2016, relations
over other aspects important to both countries, especially trade,
tourism, and security has been consistently cordial. Hence, it can be
argued that the negative consequence suffered by Singapore for “not
complying with ASEAN norms” is only that the Singapore will have
some difficulty trying non-Singaporean linked entities under the Act
without Indonesia’s full cooperation (which may yet change down the
road). It should still be able to effectively prosecute those who have
clear linkages to Singapore. Furthermore, as a deterrent effect, many
Singaporean, Malaysian and Indonesian companies with linkages to
Singapore will have to re-examine their direct and indirect links to
entities causing forest fires lest they come within the Act’s purview72.
Already, preventive notices sent out by the NEA have prompted a
degree of compliance on the part of companies which have responded73.
As predicted by the “myth” framework, in the broader scope of
regional relations and ASEAN regionalism, no negative consequences
have been incurred. In fact, some scholars have identified the true
value of the THPA as lying more in exerting pressure on Indonesia
Francis Chan. “Singapore, Indonesia mark 50 years of relations”. Straits Times, 8
Sept 2017.
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to take greater action of its own74. At the very least, Indonesia is
now fully on board with the ATHP, something that the whole region
has been waiting for with bated breath. While several scholars are
pessimistic that Indonesia’s ratification will many any difference to
the effectiveness of the ATHP (due to it being a fundamentally weak
instrument) 75, there is hope in terms of the eventual establishment
of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Haze in Riau, the easing the
process of seeking and receiving assistance76, and the full participation
of Indonesia at ASEAN level meetings (instead of just being an
observer)77. Furthermore, Singapore has openly implied that the recent
“active efforts by the Indonesian government” to prevent repeats of
severe haze episodes was indirectly influenced by Singapore’s passing
of the THPA. For example, Indonesia has recently been more actively
using legal means to prosecute wrongdoers. PT Nasional Sago Prima
was fined IDR1.07 trillion (USD81 million) for its link to forest fires in
Indonesia. Indonesia has further announced that it is pursuing five other
lawsuits against companies linked to forest fires78.
V. MALAYSIA: NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS
The country of Malaysia, which is positioned north of both Indonesia
and Singapore, is also a central actor in the regional haze equation.
Malaysia also suffers from haze as a result from fires in neighbouring
Indonesia. In addition, Malaysia also, even though to a lesser extent,
suffers from self-inflicted haze, from fires within their own territory.
The fires in Malaysia generally does not affect any other Southeast
Asian country – thee smoke haze produced generally remains internal
Lee et al., see note 32, p.6
See for example Helena Varkkey.Recent ASEAN Developments on Peatfires and
Haze: National Responses. Malaysian Journal of International Relations, 4, 163173.2016.
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or are blown off into the sparsely populated South China Sea. It can be
said that the haze that affects Malaysia is slightly less severe than that
of Singapore. Being a small island state, haze episodes affect the whole
of Singapore at once, in effect “shutting off” the entire island, especially
when this involves airport closures. In comparison, haze would affect
only certain parts of Malaysia at a time, and only rarely does the situation
become bad enough that all parts of Malaysia are enveloped. Despite this
however, the parts that do get affected also suffer badly. For example,
the recent severe haze episode in 2013 affected the southernmost states
of Malaysia especially badly; prompted the Malaysian government to
declare a state of emergency in two southern districts, causing hundreds
of schools to be closed for several days79.
In the early days of Singapore’s THPA, Malaysia also announced
that it is considering putting into place a similar law and is studying the
feasibility of such a low in the context of the country’s constitution80.
However, after the diplomatic ruckus between Indonesia and Singapore
regarding the warrant and related THPA issues, Malaysia has since
toned down on its legal intentions. In early 2017, Malaysia’s Minister
of Natural Resources and Environment admitted that Singapore’s
difficulties in enforcing the THPA prompted Malaysia to reconsider
such a legalistic approach81. A major issue that was identified was the
question of how owners of errant firms will not be caught as long as
they do not enter the countries implementing such laws82. Hence, he
said that Malaysia has decided that diplomacy was a better option and
would work better than enacting a law similar to the THPA, noting that
“we can get access to the authorities in Indonesia”83 .
Malaysia’s national interests are a combination of that of Indonesia
The Sun Daily. “PM declares haze emergency in Muar and Ledang”. The Sun Daily,
23 June 2013.
80
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and Singapore. While many powerful and well-connected Malaysian
companies make up the largest foreign investor group in the Indonesian
palm oil sector, Malaysia also is facing steadily increasing pressure from
civil society back home. In addition to this, Malaysia is also a major
palm oil producer in the world (the second largest after Indonesia),
and faces its own internal fire and haze issues. Malaysia’s relationship
with Indonesia however, is more complicated than that of Singapore
with Indonesia. Indeed, Malaysia is an important trading partner with
Indonesia84. However, one of the biggest political conflicts in Malaysia’s
history, which almost culminated in war, was the Konfrontasi with
Indonesia in 196385. Following this, the Malaysia-Indonesia relationship
has been fraught with cross-border conflicts, including ownership
rights to various cultural items like songs, cloth (batik), dances and
food86. Most recently, passions flared again when Malaysia mistakenly
printed the image of the Indonesian flag upside-down in a SEA Games
pamphlet87. Hence, compared to Singapore, Malaysia is much warier of
stepping on Indonesia’s toes.
It is clear that Malaysia has played a “wait and see” game with regards
to unilateral legal action over transboundary haze. Indeed, Malaysia
was genuinely interested in pursuing legal recourse with Indonesia
for haze, especially since Indonesia’s general response to Malaysia’s
concerns over the years was, as mentioned above, “check your own
companies first”88. However, once Indonesia’s response towards
Singapore’s THPA turned sour, Malaysia has all but abandoned this
legalistic approach. Several factors in relation to ASEAN regionalism
is at play here. Firstly, Malaysia was the main proponent of the ATHP
at the ASEAN level, and indeed was the first country to ratify it mere
months after it was signed. Indeed, since Singapore has been perceived
Bernama. “Malaysia is among Indonesia’s biggest trading partners with trade over
US$24b”. Malay Mail Online, 28 January 2015
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as “overstepping the ATHP”, Malaysia would not want to be considered
doing the same, especially since Malaysia was the main proponent of
the agreement. Secondly, Malaysia’s statement that “we can get access
to the authorities in Indonesia” can be read that Malaysia wants to be
perceived as having a better relationship with Indonesia as compared to
Singapore, and hence does not have to resort to legalistic procedures to
get the information and results they want.
However, it must be reminded that Malaysia’s interests continue to
be more in line with Indonesia’s, especially in terms of the important
Malaysian elite interests active in Indonesia, that the Malaysian
authorities would still seek to protect. While civil society groups like
CERAH89 and Global Environmental Centre90 are slowly gathering
more traction, the flow of information from civil society, especially over
environmental issues, to the Malaysian government is still limited91,
and would be hard pressed to have enough influence to change national
priorities. Hence, to preserve crucial national interests, Malaysia chose
to adhere to the norms of the ASEAN Way, citing diplomacy (nonlegalistic procedures) as the continued preferred approach in addressing
transboundary haze. While the “myth” framework, and Singapore’s
experience would predict that there would be no adverse consequences
to Malaysia at the regional level should it enact a law of its own (in this
way, going against ASEAN Way norms), Malaysia also has to consider
how this may be detrimental to Malaysia’s own interests (by putting the
well-connected Malaysian companies at risk of unwanted scrutiny of
their practices), and also to Malaysia’s continued turbulent relationship
with Indonesia. It is however interesting to note, for future reference,
that Malaysia does not seem to have completely abandoned the idea
of giving the environment a stronger legal standing. In early 2017,
Malaysian Chief Justice Tun Arifin Zakaria expressed his desire for the
country’s constitution to be amended to include the “right to a clean and
healthy environment”92.
Susan Tam. “Towards smog-free skies in Malaysia. Catalyst Asia, 13 August”.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this paper has zoomed in on legal developments in
three of the major countries involved in transboundary haze pollution
in Southeast Asia. Using the “myth” of the ASEAN Way framework,
this paper argues that shifts in national interests can explain why
certain countries changed their engagement patterns with the ASEAN
organization and also with other ASEAN member countries over
the haze issue. Namely, Singapore’s national interests have shifted
alongside a shift in their economic priorities: from a natural resourcebased economy to one more reliant on human resources. As such,
Singapore’s national interests became more closely aligned with that of
their public, and not that of Singaporean companies in the Indonesian
palm oil sector. This resulted in Singapore passing the THPA.
Indonesia’s move of ratifying the ATHP soon after Singapore’s
move in turn highlights that while Indonesia’s interests have not
changed, its strategy for preserving those interests have had to evolve
alongside the evolving regional environment. Since Singapore’s THPA
now threatens legal action on Indonesian interests, Indonesia chose
to ratifying the agreement in an attempt to delegitimize Singapore’s
action as not in line with the ASEAN Way norms. This paper hence
argues that for Indonesia, ratification of the ATHP was a “lesser evil”
compared to the THPA. The “myth” framework argues that states can
pick and choose compliance with ASEAN Way norms without suffering
any consequences. This paper shows that while there have been some
consequences to Singapore’s unilateral legal move, these have been
minimal and in fact may yet inspire positive outcomes on the road to
more effective haze mitigation.
Malaysia, in turn, has showed indecisiveness on whether or not to
put into place legal instruments similar to Singapore. While the “myth”
framework and Singapore’s track record shows that even if Malaysia
does do so, consequences should be minimal, Malaysia’s national
interests (and also its turbulent diplomatic history with Indonesia) that
still lie more closely aligned with Indonesia’s would prevent Malaysia
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to do so. Overall, this paper provides further evidence to illustrate and
strengthen the “myth” of the ASEAN Way framework, which argues that
an ASEAN state can choose to not adhere to the ASEAN Way in order
to preserve crucial interests, without suffering any consequences at the
regional level. Indeed, ASEAN member states do not blindly follow the
ASEAN Way principles due to some deeply ingrained “habit”. Hence, a
close examination of any change in a state’s national interest should be
a good indicator in predicting state compliance to ASEAN Way norms
over particular issues.
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